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Temporary Contracts as a Screening Device
in the Frictional Labour Market?
Makoto MASUI
Abstract :In this paper,we develop a matching model with both permanent and temporary
contracts to address situations in which the quality of a match formed by a worker-firm pair
is not observable to both workers and firms. The screening and cost-saving aspects of
temporary employment contracts are two primary reasons that firms use them,but screening
has received little attention in the study of employment protection.We show that a reduction
in dismissal costs increases job creation and decreases the difference between hiring thresh-
olds of permanent and temporary employees. The latter result implies that temporary
contracts are more likely to be used as a screening device in countries with stringent
employment protections.We also examine how a change in the probability that the true
quality of a match is revealed affects firms’hiring decisions with respect to both types of
contracts.
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1. Introduction
One of the most important recent topics in labour economics is the issue of how
employment protection legislation affects labour markets. In Europe, high and persistent
unemployment rates (compared to those in the U.S.)are thought to result from stringent
employment protection that has generated labour market rigidities. In the 1980s, many
European countries addressed this problem by liberalising the use of temporary contracts,
with the aim of combating unemployment.However,introducing flexible employment con-
tracts into economies with high unemployment produced only inconclusive results and
remains theoretically and empirically controversial.Theoretical models predict that more
stringent employment protection reduces both job creation and job destruction,which makes
the overall effect on employment(and unemployment)ambiguous.This effect may imply that
more flexible regulation of temporary employment may create new jobs but that these jobs
＊I am very grateful to Hiroaki Miyamoto for his helpful comments.This work was partly supported by
JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 29014289.All remaining errors are mine.
are not well protected by employment legislation and are therefore unstable.In certain cases,
the latter effect dominates the former,and the unemployment rate rises (see Blanchard and
 
Landier (2002)and Cahuc and Postel-Vinay(2002)).
There are several reasons why employers use fixed-term employment contracts.Por-
tugal and Varejao (2009)identify three reasons for the use of such contracts:(i)saving on
 
future termination costs (and certain fringe benefits);(ii)temporary replacement;and (iii)
screening for permanent positions.The first two reasons relate directly to firing costs. If
 
firms are required to pay lower (or no) firing costs with a fixed-term contract when
 
employees are dismissed,hiring a temporary worker will save money.Furthermore, firms
 
might replace incumbent workers with temporary workers and assess the adequacy of their
 
employees for permanent positions.In this regard,temporary replacement enables screening
 
of employees. If fixed-term contracts are used to screen employees, then firms can learn
 
about the employee and decide whether the current match should be converted into a
 
permanent form.While it is controversial whether temporary contracts are stepping-stones
 
to permanent contracts or dead-ends, a considerable number of temporary workers are
 
currently being hired into longer duration contracts in certain European countries(see OECD
(2002)).??The evidence that temporary work can be a stepping-stone to permanent work
 
suggests that a screening effect is being exploited by firms with respect to such temporary
 
workers.Although several studies have incorporated the distinction between contract types
 
into theoretical models that examine the effects of employment protection legislation on
 
labour markets,the screening role of temporary contracts has not been a focus of research
 
attention.??Boockmann and Hagen (2008)and Portugal and Varejao (2009)find indications
 
that temporary contracts help screen workers for permanent positions.Even if a match is
 
revealed to be unproductive,firing a worker from a permanent job is costly in countries with
 
stringent employment protections.The screening role of temporary contracts is thus indis-
pensable in such countries.??Thus,the purpose of this paper is to theoretically examine how
 
employment protection for permanent jobs affects the hiring decisions of firms when the
 
quality of an employment match (the productivity of a worker-firm pair)is match-specific
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１)Booth et al. (2002) present evidence that temporary work is a stepping-stone to permanent work,
depending on the type of contract and gender of the employee.Ichino et al.(2008).find that a job at a
 
temporary work agency may be an effective springboard to a permanent contract in Europe although not
 
in the U.S.
２)Several studies focus on this topic:Sara(2007),Albertini et al.(2009),Bucher(2010)and Faccini(2013).
３)Beckmann and Kuhn (2012)address the issue of whether there are performance differences between
 
establishments that use temporary agency workers as a buffer stock (called the flexibility strategy)and
 
establishments that use them for screening purposes.They conclude that the productivity of establish-
ments that use the flexibility strategy is significantly lower than that of establishments that use the
 
screening strategy.
and not perfectly observable.
The equilibrium search model is helpful in studying the effects of employment protection
 
when both permanent and temporary jobs are considered.In particular,the endogenous job
 
destruction framework constructed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)is a standard model
 
for study in this field.In the basic model with endogenous job destruction,the productivity
 
of each job is characterised as a random shock,and the decisions of a firm and a worker
 
depend on the value of productivity.Thus,once a productivity shock occurs,both the firm
 
and the worker can observe it.Under this setup,conversion of a temporary contract to a
 
permanent contract also depends on the realised value of the productivity shock.With respect
 
to the screening role of temporary contracts, such a framework is unsuitable because the
 
productivity of a match is known after the shock,and there is no need to screen workers.In
 
other words, screening is significant for firms when information about a worker type or
 
match quality is not fully revealed.??
The present paper has a motivation similar to that of Faccini(2013),which extends the
 
model of Pries and Rogerson (2005) by introducing permanent and temporary forms of
 
employment contracts and showing that this type of model can account for the high transition
 
rates from temporary to permanent employment in some European countries.??Pries and
 
Rogerson (2005)originally considered a situation in which only a publicly observable signal
 
regarding the quality of a worker-firm match is obtained at the time of meeting,while the
 
true quality of the match is revealed over time after the match has been formed and work
 
has begun.??Faccini (2013) adopts this learning mechanism to develop a model in which
 
temporary contracts are used as screening devices.
Although the motivation for this paper is similar to that of Faccini(2013),there are two
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４)Based on the notion that some aspects of a worker-firm match can only be revealed after the
 
employment relationship has been established,Nagypal (2002)focus on the difference in the learning
 
process between learning about match quality and learning-by-doing and examine how an economy’s
 
average productivity is affected by the imposition of dismissal costs.Using a model of heterogeneous
 
workers that incorporates search frictions and endogenous separations of employment matches,Ravenna
 
and Walsh (2012) examine how the heterogeneity of workers amplifies unemployment fluctuations,
depending on the size of gross labour flows and asymmetric productivity shocks. In their model, a
 
worker’s type is revealed by interviewing and screening in the job search and recruitment process.
５)Several studies extend the framework of Pries and Rogerson (2005). Sara (2007) incorporates job
-specific shocks and examines the impact of employment protection on labour productivity. In Sara
(2007),the productivity of a job match is composed of a job-specific component and a match-specific
 
component,where the former is observable,but the latter is unobservable.Regarding the match-specific
 
component, her model is based on the same process of learning about the true quality of the match.
Albertini et al.(2009)focus on the screening effect of temporary jobs on transitions to regular employ-
ment. In their model, the effects of hiring and firing subsidies on the unemployment rate and social
 
welfare are examined.Bucher(2010)investigates the conditions under which temporary jobs are stepping
-stones to permanent jobs.
major differences in the structure of the models.First,Faccini(2013)assumes that firms can
offer temporary employment with exogenous probability,which represents a restriction on
the use of temporary contracts.In this paper,however,we assume that firms endogenously
choose what type of contract to offer.This assumption enables us to examine how a change
in regulations regarding the termination of permanent employment contracts distorts firms’
optimal hiring decisions.Second,in Faccini(2013),a firm is allowed to maintain an employee
in a temporary position continuously if the match quality is not revealed and a negative
economic shock does not occur.However,we do not permit this possibility,and all temporary
jobs can persist for only one period.At the end of each period,firms with an employee in a
temporary position must decide whether they wish to convert the current employment
contract into a permanent contract or terminate the employment relationship.
In addition,we note that the endogenous choice between permanent and temporary jobs
is a key element of this model.As noted by Cahuc et al.(2012),the prior literature assumes
that temporary jobs are preferable to permanent ones and that all new jobs start as tempo-
rary jobs or that regulation forces firms to create permanent jobs.However,various regula-
tions on the use of temporary contracts―pertaining,for example,to valid reasons for the use
of FTCs(fixed-term contracts),the maximum number of successive FTCs and the maximum
cumulative duration of successive FTCs―are imposed in many OECD countries (see the
employment protection legislation database of ILO).As a result of these regulations,offering
temporary contracts may not always be the best choice. Accordingly, we assume that a
temporary job lasts only one period??and show that the types of contracts chosen depend on
the realised value of the observed signal of a match type.As research regarding the choice
between temporary and permanent jobs (combined with a screening role of temporary jobs)
is limited,our paper offers new insights into the impact of employment protection.??
Three main results are obtained.First, a reduction in dismissal costs with respect to
permanent jobs increases job creation.Lower dismissal costs reduce the hiring threshold for
６)Kugler and Saint-Paul(2004)develop a matching model in which adverse selection and firing costs are
incorporated, examining reemployment probabilities of employed and unemployed workers. Because
employers can only observe worker quality imperfectly,they may hire workers with poor match quality.
Kugler and Saint-Paul show that the introduction of unjust dismissal provisions reduces the reemploy-
ment probabilities of unemployed job seekers but not that of employed job seekers.
７)Cahuc et al.(2012)note that in France,the average duration of temporary jobs is quite short(about one
and a half months)and construct a job search and matching model with different expected durations to
capture the choice of employers regarding the forms of contracts.
８)Kahn (2010)uses the two-period model to investigate the impact of easing the creation of temporary
jobs and shows that temporary contracts are more advantageous for employers during recessions than
booms.Cao et al. (2011)extend Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), incorporating on-the-job search and
permanent and temporary contracts into their model.They show that an increase in firing costs increases
wage inequality and decreases the unemployment rate.
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each type of employment contract,and firms with vacancies can thus form matches in shorter
 
periods.This increases the expected profit of vacancies and job creation.Second,a reduction
 
in dismissal costs decreases the difference between hiring thresholds of permanent and
 
temporary contracts.Although the effect of changes in dismissal costs on the hiring thresh-
olds of each employment contract is indeterminate,this result implies that employers will be
 
less selective in hiring a worker through permanent contracts. In other words, temporary
 
contracts are more likely to be used as a screening device in countries with stringent
 
employment protections.A numerical exercise shows that higher dismissal costs reduce the
 
hiring threshold for temporary jobs and raise the threshold for permanent jobs.Third,we
 
examine how a change in the probability that the true quality of a match is revealed affects
 
firms’hiring decisions with respect to both temporary and permanent jobs.According to the
 
numerical exercise, a rise in this probability lowers the hiring threshold for temporary
 
contracts.In contrast,the effect of a rise in the probability of revelation on the threshold for
 
permanent jobs can be either positive or negative, and the timing of a change in its sign
 
depends on dismissal costs(the effect is negative for low values of the revelation probability
 
but turns positive for higher values).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.In Section 2,the basic framework
 
of the model is described.In Section 3,a steady-state equilibrium is characterised.In Section
 
4,we investigate how dismissal costs affect job creation and the hiring thresholds for each
 
type of contract.Finally,Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
 
2.1 Description of the economy
 
Following Faccini (2013),we extend the model studied by Pries and Rogerson (2005)to
 
allow for two types of employment contracts:temporary contracts and permanent con-
tracts. We employ a discrete-time framework and assume that both workers and firms
 
discount the future by a constant rateβ(which is a discount factor).There are many workers
 
who are either employed or unemployed,and the measure of workers is normalised to one.
On-the-job search is ruled out,and thus only unemployed workers search for jobs.Firms are
 
measured by the free entry/exit condition.All workers and firms are assumed to be risk
-neutral.
This model explicitly includes labour market friction;therefore,job seeking and recruit-
ing activities are time consuming.We assume that the meeting process is described by a
 
constant-returns-to-scale matching technology,???,??, where? and ?are measures of
 
unemployed workers and vacancies,respectively.During each period,a firm with a vacancy
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encounters a job seeker with probability???,???,and an unemployed worker encounters a
 
vacancy with probability???,???.Let the former probability be denoted by??θ?and the
 
latter probability denoted byθ??θ?, where θ＝?? denotes labour market tightness. By
 
assuming the constant-returns-to-scale matching technology, these probabilities can be
 
represented as functions only of market tightness,θ.We assume that??θ?→1 andθ??θ?→
0 asθ→0,and??θ?→0 and thatθ??θ?→1 asθ→∞.
The production technology and the learning processes regarding match quality are based
 
on Pries and Rogerson(2005)and Faccini(2013).We first consider the production technology;
a unit of production is a matched worker-firm pair,and the productivity of each job is match
-specific.??As in the above literature,match-specific productivity is observed at the end of
 
the period;it is represented by?＝?＋?,where?is a zero-mean independently and identi-
cally distributed random variable and follows a uniform distribution with support?－?,??.?
is the true quality of a match,which is either high or low;matches with high productivity
 
are represented by??＝???,and matches with low productivity are represented by??＝??.
Owing to the presence of the noise term?,neither the worker nor the firm can observe the
 
true productivity of the match.
Match quality is considered to be both an inspection and an experience good.When a job
 
seeker and a vacant firm meet,they observe a signalπ,which represents the probability that
 
the match will be good.This signal is drawn from the cumulative distribution??π?and is
 
independent across matches.We assume that firms make hiring decisions based only on the
 
realisation ofπ.After forming a match,a worker and a firm observe productivity???and
 
update their information about the true match quality. If realised productivity falls in the
 
range ???＋?,??＋??, the worker and firm learn that the match has high productivity.
Similarly,if realised productivity falls in the range???－?,??－??,the match is revealed to be
 
of low quality.If realised productivity is in the range???－?,??＋??,nothing is learned (we
 
assume that??－?＜??＋?).Thus,the learning process is a form of“all-or-nothing”.Letα＝
???－???2?denote the probability that the true match quality is revealed.In this setting,a
 
match of an unknown type with prior probabilityπwill be revealed as high productivity with
 
probabilityαπand will be revealed as low productivity with probabilityα?1－π?.We suppose
 
that the quality of a match is unchanged when the match is retained.
2.2 Contracts
 
In this model,two types of contracts are considered:temporary contracts and perma-
９)‘Match-specific’means that the productivity of each match depends on a worker whom an employer
 
meets in the search process.
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nent contracts. In addition, there are two states of permanent contracts:preexisting and
 
newly created.When preexisting permanent workers are dismissed, firms must pay fixed
 
dismissal costs (firing taxes)?＞0. However, no cost is imposed when new permanent
 
workers and temporary workers are dismissed.The transfer component of dismissal costs is
 
not considered in this paper.???
Separations from permanent jobs occur(i)when the match quality is revealed to be bad
 
or (ii)when the economy turns out to be poor with constant probabilityλ.With respect to
 
temporary jobs,however,we assume that employees are dismissed if the true quality of the
 
match is not revealed. In this regard,we implicitly assume that the maximum length of
 
temporary contracts is legally limited and that a firm with a temporary job must decide
 
whether to rehire its employee through a permanent contract or dismiss him.???
2.3 Bellman equations
 
To derive the values of firms with each type of contract,some notation must be defined.
Let us denote the value of a firm having a temporary job and a signalπby???π?and the
 
value of a firm having a permanent job and a signalπby???π?,where?is an indicator
 
function that takes zero for a new permanent match and one for a preexisting match.The
 
value of a vacant job is denoted by?.
The expected value of a firm having a temporary job and a signalπis represented by
???π?＝π??＋?1－π???－???π?＋β?λ?＋?1－λ??α?π??1?
＋?1－π???＋?1－α????, (1)
where??is the wage paid for a temporary job.As defined above,πis the probability that
 
a match will be good,and flow productivity is given by the expected value,using π.At the
 
end of the period,a match-specific shock is realised,with the employer learning that the true
 
quality of a match is high with probabilityαπ and low with probability α?1－π?. With
 
probability1－α,the quality of a match is not revealed.In this case,the prediction regarding
 
the quality of a match cannot be revised, and the employment relationship is terminated
10)The relative size and importance of each component (the firing tax component and the transfer
 
component)differ across countries.Garibaldi and Violante(2005)posit that the transfer component is not
 
negligible in Italy,whereas the tax component of dismissal costs is considered to be substantially larger
 
than the transfer component.They argue that the neutrality of severance payments,which was shown by
 
Lazear (1990),continues to hold in their framework.
11)We will provide more details regarding job conversion below.This model is based on the idea that
 
firms screen eligible workers for permanent positions. Faccini (2013) assumes that a match with an
 
unknown type in a temporary job can be retained in the next period with exogenous probability.In our
 
model,however,we assume that job conversion from temporary to permanent does not occur when the
 
true match quality is unknown.
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because temporary contracts cannot be renewed in the next period.
The expected value of a firm with a permanent job and signalπis represented by
???π?＝π??＋?1－π???－???π?＋β?λ??－??
＋?1－λ??α?π??1?＋?1－π???－???＋?1－α???π???, (2)
where??is the wage paid for a permanent job of type???＝0,1?.Newly created matches are
not covered by employment protection,and the outside option of those matches therefore
does not include dismissal costs.Conversely,all matches are covered by employment protec-
tion one period later,and employers must pay dismissal costs for firing workers.
The expected value of a vacant firm is represented by
?＝－?＋β??θ? ?
??????π?＋ ??
?????π????π?＋ ??
???π????π?＋?1－??θ????,
(3)
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
where?denotes the flow recruiting costs,andπ??＝?,??is the hiring threshold for contract
type?(? represents“permanent,”and? represents“temporary”).We here assume thatπ?
＞π?,as formally shown below.In equation (3),the employers’choice regarding whether an
employment match is designated as permanent or temporary depends on the realisation of the
signalπ.
Let us denote the value of being employed in a temporary job with signalπas ???π?.
The value of being employed in a permanent job with signal π and the value of being
unemployed are denoted by???π?and?,respectively;(?is the indicator function that was
defined above).The expected value of being employed in a temporary job with signalπis
represented by
???π?＝???π?－γ＋β?λ?＋?1－λ??α?π??1?＋?1－π???＋?1－α????, (4)
whereγrepresents the constant disutility of work.
The expected value of being employed in a permanent job with signalπis represented
by
???π?＝???π?－γ＋β?λ?＋?1－λ??α?π??1?＋?1－π???＋?1－α???π???, (5)
and the expected value of being unemployed is represented as follows:
?＝βθ??θ? ?
??????π?＋ ??
?????π????π?＋ ??
???π????π?＋?1－θ??θ????. (6)??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
2.4 Surplus of a match
Let us define the joint surplus generated from forming a match as follows:
???π?＝???π?＋???π?－??－???－?,for?＝0,1,
???π?＝???π?＋???π?－?－?,
where each equation is evaluated at anyπ∈?0,1?.The first equation represents the surplus
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of a permanent job with current status?.The second equation represents the surplus of a
 
temporary job.The type of match formed depends on the level of the observed signalπ.We
 
suppose that the wage in each job is determined by a standard asymmetric Nash bargaining
 
process and denote the worker’s bargaining power byη∈?0,1?.Under this wage determina-
tion mechanism,the worker and the firm that form a match divide the surplus according to
 
the following sharing rule:
???π?－??－???＝?1－η????π?and ???π?－?＝η???π?,for?＝0,1, (7)
???π?－?＝?1－η????π?and ???π?－?＝η???π?. (8)
Using these sharing rules,we can derive the expressions for joint surplus as follows.
First,the values of joint surplus for permanent jobs are given by
??π?＝π??＋?1－π???－γ＋β?1－λ??απ??1?＋?1－α???π??－ η?θβ?1－η?－β?, (9)????
??π?＝π??＋?1－π???－γ＋β?1－λ??απ??1?＋?1－α???π??－ η?θβ?1－η?＋?1－β??, (10)????
where we have used the free-entry condition that the values of vacancies are equal to zero:
?＝0.Second, the surplus???π?generated by forming a match in the temporary form is
 
represented by
???π?＝π??＋?1－π???－γ＋β?1－λ?απ??1?－ η?θβ?1－η?. (11)????
3. Equilibrium
 
3.1 Hiring decision
 
We first consider the hiring decisions of firms with permanent jobs.A firm decides to
 
hire a worker on a permanent basis ifπ?π?.The corresponding condition for optimal hiring
 
is given by??π??＝???π??.To obtain a concrete expression for this condition,it is useful to
 
express??π?in a more tractable form.From (10),we obtain
??π?＝π??＋?1－π???－γ＋?1－β??－η?θ?β?1－η?＋β?1－λ?απ??1?1－β?1－λ??1－α? . (12)????????????????????????????
Utilising (9),(10)and (12),the following two results are derived:
??π?＝??π?－?, (13)
??′π?＝??－??＋β?1－λ?α??1?1－β?1－λ??1－α? . (14)???????????
The first result depicts the relationship between??π?and??π?.The surplus generated by
 
a preexisting permanent job is equal to the sum of the surplus generated by a newly created
 
permanent job and the cost of dismissal.The second result indicates that?′?π?is indepen-
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dent ofπ,where?′?π?represents the differentiation of??π?with respect to π. After a
 
match is revealed to be good?π＝1?,the surplus in this case is expressed by
??1?＝??－γ＋?1－β??－η?θ?β?1－η?1－β?1－λ? . (15)???????????????
We assume that??is high enough that the numerator of(15)is positive,which would indicate
 
that (14)has a positive sign and that??π?is increasing inπ.
We next consider the existence ofπ?that satisfies??π??＝???π??.It follows from(9)and
(11)that
??π?－???π?＝β?1－λ??απ?＋?1－α???π??－β?,
＝β?1－λ??1－α???π?－β?1－απ?1－λ???, (16)
and the condition??π??＝???π??is expressed as
?1－λ??1－α???π??＝?1－απ??1－λ???,
? ?1－λ??1－α?1－β?1－λ??1－α????－??＋β?1－λ?α??1??π?＋??－γ＋?1－β??－
η?θ
β?1－η?
＝?－α?1－λ??π?. (17)
??????????? ????
?
?
This results in
π?＝η?θ?β?1－η?－???－γ?＋?1－?1－λ??1－α?????1－λ??1－α???－??＋βα?1－λ???1?＋α?1－β?1－λ??1－α?????1－α?. (17′)???????????????????????????
Subsequently,(11)yields the explicit form ofπ?that is characterised by???π??＝0:
π?＝ η?θ?β?1－η?－???－γ???－??＋βα?1－λ????1?－??. (18)?????????????
Becauseπ?must be greater than zero,we suppose that??satisfies the following condition for
 
a givenθ:
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?＞0. (19)????
This condition requires that??should be sufficiently low for any positiveθ.Otherwise,even
 
if the true productivity is??with probability one,the expected costs of recruiting job seekers
 
are smaller than the expected net productivity???－γ?,and every worker-firm pair yields non
-negative profits,regardless of the realisation ofπ.We do not consider this case.
For the value of a π?that is a solution to equation (17), the following proposition is
 
obtained.
Proposition 1
 
There exists a uniqueπ?that satisfies (17)and is contained in the interval?0,1?if (19)holds
 
and ??is sufficiently high to satisfy the following condition for a given θ:
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??－γ－ η?θβ?1－η?－
λ?1－βα?1－λ???
?1－λ??1－α? ?0. (20)???? ????????
Furthermore,π?is strictly greater than π?.
Proof
 
See Appendix A.
We permit the case π?＝1, as there are countries in which the hiring threshold for
 
permanent jobs is quite high,and most newly created jobs are temporary.???
Employers set a higher hiring threshold for permanent contracts relative to temporary
 
contracts.The crucial difference between the two types of contract is whether dismissal costs
 
are imposed. If π takes a low value, a contract is more likely to be terminated. In a
 
permanent contract, an employer must pay these costs for termination, and a lower π
increases the probability of this event.Thus,a high probability of a good match is necessary
 
for a permanent contract to compensate for higher expected costs.We further note that the
 
employers’choice between permanent and temporary contracts is endogenous and that a
 
unique value ofπ?exists.Given the assumption that temporary jobs last one period,a portion
 
of newly created jobs take the form of permanent contracts?π?＜1?.
3.2 Job creation
 
The measure of vacant jobs that is posted in equilibrium is determined by the free-entry
 
condition.Equation (4),with?＝0,implies
?
?1－η???θ?＝β ??
?????π????π?＋ ??
???π????π?,
＝β??′??
???1－??π???π＋??′??
??1－??π???π, (21)
?????? ??
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
where
??′＝??－??＋β?1－λ?α???1?－??,??′＝?′?＝??－??＋β?1－λ?α??1?1－β?1－λ??1－α? .???????????
The LHS of(21)increases inθbecause??θ?is a decreasing function ofθ.The impact ofθ
on the RHS of(21)is more complicated,but we can show that it decreases inθ.Differentiat-
ing the RHS of(21)with respect toθyields
12)According to Gu?ell and Petrongolo (2007), the share of fixed-term contracts in new hires reached
 
approximately 91-95 per cent during 1985-2002 in Spain.This tendency is also observed in other European
 
countries in which restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts have been relaxed,as in France.
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β ???′?θ ??
???1－??π???π－?1－??π??????′－??′??π??θ
－??′?1－??π????π??θ＋
???′
?θ ??
??1－??π???π.
?
???
?
? ??
?? ????
?
?
From (15),??1?decreases inθ,and the following results hold:
?π?
?θ＞0,
?π?
?θ＞0,
???′
?θ＜0,
???′
?θ＜0.?? ?? ?? ??
The first two results show that increased market tightness reduces the meeting probability
 
of employers;hence,they raise their hiring threshold to ensure profits.Taking into account,
from (16),that?′?＞?′?for anyπ,we conclude that the RHS of(21)decreases withθ.The
 
conclusion of this subsection can thus be summarised as follows:
Proposition 2
 
There exists a unique value of θthat satisfies the job creation condition (21).???
As observed by Bucher (2010),it is difficult to show analytically the unique existence of
 
a steady-state equilibrium in a Pries-Rogerson type model in which permanent and tempo-
rary jobs are incorporated.However,our model overcomes this difficulty and enables us to
 
investigate the impact of employment protection analytically.
3.3 Employment flows
 
Let us denote the steady-state measure of permanent workers by??and the measure of
 
temporary workers by??.Similarly,the measure of matches that are known to be good is
 
denoted by??,and the measure of matches that have unknown quality is denoted by??.In
 
the steady-state equilibrium,the following equivalence conditions must hold in each employ-
ment pool.
The equivalence of the inflow and outflow from the employment pool of temporary
 
contracts yields the following condition:
??＝θ??θ????π??－??π????. (22)
The LHS of(22)reflects the assumption that every temporary contract is terminated in the
 
next period,and each temporary worker will either be employed with a permanent contract
13)A boundary condition atθ＝0is necessary for the existence of a unique intersection between the locus
 
of the LHS of(21)and that of the RHS of(21).As??θ?goes to one asθgoes to zero,either high recruiting
 
costs or strong bargaining power of workers must be present to obtain the conclusion that the locus of
 
the LHS of(21)lies below its RHS.
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or unemployed. Regarding the RHS of (22), only worker-firm pairs that realise a signal
 
contained in?π?,π??form matches in the form of temporary contracts.
In the pool of high quality employment,equivalence of inflows and outflows yields
λ??＝?1－λ?α???π?π??π＜π????＋??π?π??π????－????, (23)
where
??π?π??π＜π??＝ 1??π??－??π????
??π???π?, (24)??????????
??π?π??π?＝ 11－??π????
?π???π?. (25)???????
The LHS of(23)indicates that a negative shock,which occurs with probabilityλ,causes the
 
separation of the employment relationship.The RHS of(23)indicates that matches for both
 
temporary positions and permanent positions with unknown type are revealed to be high
 
productivity with probability?1－λ?αmultiplied by the expected value of the signal (απ
represents the probability that an unknown match with signalπturns out to be good).
In the employment pool of permanent jobs with unknown productivity, the following
 
equivalence condition is obtained:
?λ＋?1－λ?α????－???＝θ??θ??1－??π????. (26)
In the LHS of(26),outflows from this employment pool result from negative economic shocks
 
and the revelation of matches that are either low or high productivity. The RHS of (26)
captures inflows into this pool;it is composed of newly formed matches with signals that
 
exceed π?. Note that ??－???＝??－???represents the measure of matches with unknown
 
productivity in permanent contracts.
Together with two additional conditions,
??＝??＋??－??, (27)
?＝1－??－??, (28)
(22),(23)and(26)－(28)determine the steady-state value of??,??,??,??and?.Solving these
 
equations,we obtain
?＝λ?λ＋?1－λ?α?Φ?θ,π?,π??, (29)????????
??＝θ??θ??1－??π????λ＋?1－λ?α??π?π??π??λ?λ＋?1－λ?α?
＋?1－λ?α??π?π??π＜π?????π??－??π???λ ?, (30)
?
??????????????????
?????????????????????
??＝θ??θ????π??－??π????, (31)
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??＝?1－λ?αθ??θ??λ
?1－??π?????π?π??π?
λ＋?1－λ?α ＋???π??－??π?????π?π??π＜π??, (32)????????
?
?????????????
?
?
??＝θ??θ???λ＋?1－λ?α????π??－??π???＋1－??π????λ＋?1－λ?α , (33)????????????????????????
where
Φ?θ,π?,π??≡λ?λ＋?1－λ?α?＋θ??θ???λ＋?1－λ?α????π??－??π???
×?λ＋?1－λ?α??π?π??π＜π???＋?1－??π????λ＋?1－λ?α??π?π??π???.
3.4 Wages
 
As the surplus sharing rules have already been derived,we can solve the Nash wage
 
equations for each type of employment contract.From (4)and (8), the wage equations for
 
temporary contracts are given by
???π?＝γ＋?1－β??＋η???π?－β?1－λ?απη??1?. (34)
Similarly,it follows from(5)and(7)that the wage equations for permanent contracts of type
?are given by
??π?＝γ＋?1－β??＋η??π?－βη?1－λ??απ??1?＋?1－α???1??, (35)
??π?＝γ＋?1－β??＋η??π?－βη?1－λ??απ??1?＋?1－α???1??. (36)
The steady-state equilibrium in this model is characterised by?π?,π?,θ,?,??,??,??,??,
???π?,???π???＝0,1??,which are determined by(17′),(18),(21),(29)―(36).Be-causeθ,π?and
π?are uniquely determined,other endogenous variables are also uniquely determined.
4. The effect of dismissal costs on hiring decisions
 
4.1 The direct effect of dismissal costs
 
To examine the effects of dismissal costs on firms’hiring decisions in steady state
 
equilibrium, we first consider how these costs affect labour market tightness. For that
 
Figure 1 Employment flows (??is the measure of permanent workers with unknown match productivity)
［1］ λ＋?1－λ??1－α??π?π??π＜π???
［2］ θ??θ????π??－??π???
［3］ θ??θ??1－??π???
［4］ λ＋α?1－λ?
［5］ ?1－λ?α??π?π??π＜π??
［6］ ?1－λ?α??π?π??π?
［7］ λ
??
??
??
［6］
??
??［7］
［4］
［3］
［5］
［2］［1］
?
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purpose,the effects of?on the hiring thresholds must be identified.It follows from(15)and
(18)that,for a givenθ,a response ofπ?to a change in?is given by
?π?
??＝
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?
β?αλ?1－λ?
?1－β?1－λ?????－??＋βα?1－λ????1?－????＞0. (37)??
?
?????
?
??????????????????????
A higher dismissal cost raises the hiring threshold for temporary jobs because an increase in
the future expected surplus is offset by the increased firing cost;employers tend to cover
this cost by hiring more high-potential employees (that is,workers with higherπ).
From (17′),a change in?has the following effect onπ?for a givenθ:
?π?
??＝
ν
???－??＋βα?1－λ???1?＋κ?????－??＋
βα?1－λ?
1－β?1－λ???－γ－
η?θ
β?1－η?
－α?1－λ??1－β?1－λ??1＋βλ?1－α????1－β?1－λ???1－?1－λ??1－α??
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ? ,
(38)
?? ????????????????? ??????
?
? ????
?
?
???????????????????????
?
?
?
?
where
κ≡α?1－β?1－λ??1－α??1－α andν≡
1－?1－λ??1－α?
?1－λ??1－α? .??????????? ????????
Although(38)is somewhat complex,we can identify its sign explicitly.The result is summar-
ised in the following lemma.
Lemma 1
An increase in dismissal costs raises π?for a given θif (20)is satisfied.
Proof
See Appendix B.
We can provide the same interpretation as in the case ofπ?.Using the results regarding
the hiring thresholds described above,the effect of an increased dismissal cost on job creation
can be examined.The effect of an increase in?on the RHS of(21)for a givenθis given as
follows:
β ???′?? ??
???1－??π???π－???′－??′??1－??π????π???
－??′?1－??π????π???＋
???′
?? ??
??1－??π???π. (39)
?
???
?
? ??
?? ????
?
?
To identify the sign of(39),we note that the following lemma holds.
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Lemma 2
 
For a given θand a sufficiently highβ,π?－π?is increasing in ?if ??satisfies
??－γ－ η?θβ?1－η?－2βλ?＞0,????
and αsatisfies
α? 1－2λ2?1－λ?. (40)?????
The inequality(40)is likely to be satisfied for a lower λ.
Proof
 
See Appendix C.
From (37)and Lemma 1,we obtain the following proposition regarding the effect of
 
dismissal costs on job creation.
Proposition 3
 
The sign of (39)is negative and ?θ??＜0if βis sufficiently high.
Proof
 
See Appendix D.
An increase in dismissal costs reduces the expected profits of firms with vacancies,
leading to decreased job creation. The result obtained in Proposition 3 is standard and
 
intuitive.However, the main focus of this paper lies in how the costs of firing employees
 
affect employers’hiring policies. Unfortunately, the effects of? on π?and π?are both
 
ambiguous when the effect throughθis taken into account.An increase in dismissal costs
 
raises the hiring thresholds for both types of employment contract,while job creation is
 
reduced as a result of this increase, giving rise to a decline in both thresholds. We will
 
therefore investigate the effect of?on the differenceπ?－π?.
Proposition 4
 
The difference in the hiring thresholds,π?－π?is increasing in ?if ?is sufficiently large.
Proof
 
See Appendix E.
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For higher?,π?－π?increases,indicating that employers raise the hiring threshold more
 
for permanent than for temporary employment. This implies that employers are more
 
selective in hiring permanent workers than temporary workers. Specifically, screening
 
employees through temporary employment becomes more important for employers because
 
permanent contracts involve higher future dismissal costs.Furthermore,Propositions 3 and
 
4 have the following implication.Reducing dismissal costs not only increases job creation but
 
reduces the differenceπ?－π?.A reduction in the difference in hiring thresholds may lead to
 
an increase in the relative proportion of permanent employment but a decrease in the average
 
productivity of jobs,as employers may become less concerned about the quality of matches.
Accordingly,lower dismissal costs may help generate new jobs in the economy,but we should
 
be mindful of the effect of this institutional change on the average productivity of labour.
To obtain clear-cut results regarding the effects of a change in ? on π?and π?, we
 
conduct the following numerical exercise.In accordance with common practice,we suppose
 
that the matching function is Cobb-Douglas:???,??＝?????.The distribution function
 
forπis assumed to be uniform.???The parameter values are chosen as described in Table 1.
The values of most of these parameters are based on related work,while several parameters
 
are chosen to make the numerical results reasonable.
Table 2 shows how a change in dismissal costs affects labour market tightness and the
 
hiring threshold for each job type.It follows from (37)and Lemma 1 that an increase in?
raises the hiring thresholds for both job types, for a givenθ.According to the numerical
 
exercise,a higher? raises the hiring threshold for permanent jobs, even allowing for the
 
impact onθ(as described in Proposition 3,a higher?decreasesθ),and reduces the threshold
 
for temporary jobs.A lowerθ,stemming from an increase in?,raises the meeting probabil-
ity for employers(??θ?is decreasing inθ).Although this leads to a lower hiring threshold for
 
each job type,it has a dominant impact only on temporary jobs.As employers with tempo-
rary employees do not pay dismissal costs,firing costs associated with permanent jobs affect
 
the joint surplus in temporary jobs only indirectly, through their effect on the surplus in
 
permanent jobs.Thus,the direct effect of?onπ?will not exceed the indirect effect through
θ.
14)Following Pries (2004),Pries and Rogerson (2005),Albertini et al.(2009)and Faccini (2013)assume a
 
mean-zero normal distribution with some positive standard deviation, truncated and rescaled in the
 
support.Although using this type of distribution will enrich our numerical exercise,we place a high
 
priority on determining the properties of firms’hiring decisions in a simple framework.
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 4.2 The effect of?
In this section,we examine how a change in the probability that the true quality of a
 
match is revealed affects firms’hiring decisions.It follows from the definition ofαthat a
 
change inαresults from a change in the range of the random productivity factor?ε?.That
 
is,the more volatile is productivity,the more difficult it is for employers to assess the true
 
quality of a match.Uncertainty regarding productivity(or demand)is a major concern of
 
employers and seriously affects hiring decisions.We therefore examine the effect ofαonθ,
π?and π?. As the hiring decision reduces to the determination ofπ?and π?, we seek to
 
determine the sign of?π??α??＝?,??.It follows from(18)that an increase inαunambiguous-
ly reduces π?for a given θ. If true match quality is revealed with higher probability,
employers can set a lower hiring threshold,so that???π??＝0 is retained.Therefore,more
 
effcient on-the-job screening lowers the hiring threshold for temporary workers.In the case
 
of permanent workers,however,a different result is obtained as follows.
Proposition 5
 
Suppose that αand ?are sufficiently high to satisfy???
β?α－?1－α??α＋λ?1－α????
?1－α?? －β?1－λ?
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ??0, (41)?????????????
?
?????
?
?
and that the following condition holds:
??－γ－ η?θβ?1－η?－?αβ?1－λ?＋λ??＞0. (42)????
Then, an increase in αraises π?for a given θ.
Proof
15)We suppose thatαsatisfies the following condition:α??－λ＋ λ???1－λ?.This ensures the following??
inequality:α－?1－α??α＋λ?1－α???0.
Table 1 Parameter values
?? ?? γ β ? λ α ? ξ η
1.9 1.0 1.0 0.9966 0.4 0.0085 0.13 0.15 0.5 0.5
Table 2 The effect of?on?,??and??
? １ ２ ３ ４ ５ ６ ７ ８ ９ 10
θ 1.867 1.832 1.797 1.762 1.728 1.695 1.661 1.628 1.596 1.563
π? 0.351 0.377 0.399 0.418 0.436 0.451 0.466 0.479 0.49 0.501
π? 0.308 0.294 0.282 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.231 0.222 0.214
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See Appendix F.
Note that we have already shown that????π??α＞0for anyπand thatπ?is decreasing
 
inαfor givenθ.In contrast,the effect ofαonπ?crucially depends on howαaffects???π?
and??π?.If??π?decreases or increases slightly whenαincreases,π?increases.However,
the impact of αon ??π?is not determinate, owing to the assumption that firms with
 
permanent jobs retain their employees,even if the true quality of a match is unknown.In this
 
model,more efficient on-the-job screening reduces the probability of retaining a current job,
while it increases the expected profits of firms.For higher dismissal costs,the former effect
 
exceeds the latter,and the sign of???π??αis likely to be negative:from (12)and (13),we
 
obtain
???π?
?α ＝
???π?
?α ＝－
β?1－λ??1－π????－γ＋?1－β??－η?θ?β?1－η??
?1－β?1－λ??1－α??? ,???????? ??????????????????????
for a given θ.Thus, in an economy with high dismissal costs, the hiring threshold for
 
permanent contracts will be raised by an increase in the probability that the true quality of
 
match is revealed,while the hiring threshold for temporary contracts is lowered.
As θ is fixed in the above analysis of the effect ofαon π?and π?, we numerically
 
examine how a change inαaffectsθ,π?andπ?.Following Faccini(2013),the firing costs are
 
fixed at?＝5.16 in this calculation.Although it is difficult, theoretically, to determine the
 
response ofθto a change inα,Table 3 shows that an increase inαincreasesθ.Recalling
 
that,for a givenθ,a rise inαreducesπ?and raisesπ?,the results obtained in Table 3 are
 
noteworthy.Regarding the hiring threshold for temporary jobs, a direct effect ofαonπ?
exceeds its indirect effect throughθ.Thus,a higher probability that the true match quality
 
is revealed occasions a decrease inπ?.Regarding the hiring threshold for permanent jobs,it
 
follows from Table 3 that,for a smallerα,π?is decreasing inα,while for a largerα,π?is
 
increasing inα.Furthermore,the sign of?π??αchanges with lower values ofα,as dismissal
 
costs increase(see Table 4 and 5).When?＝5.16,the value ofπ?starts to increase atα＝0.25.
The corresponding values ofα,when?＝1 and?＝10,areα＝0.45 andα＝0.15,respectively.
In short,a higherαleads to an increase inπ?in the broad area ofα,if dismissal costs are
 
sufficiently high.This result is consistent with the statements of Proposition 4.The results
 
obtained in this subsection indicate that the resolution of uncertainty with respect to the true
 
match type does not always lead to a reduction of the hiring threshold for permanent jobs.
As employers dismiss employees when the quality of matches is poor,requiring them to pay
 
dismissal costs,higher dismissal costs cause the threshold to rise.The presence of dismissal
 
costs will compel employers to be cautious in hiring workers for permanent positions.
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 5. Conclusions
 
This paper has examined how employment protection of permanent contracts affects the
 
hiring decisions of employers if the true productivity of a worker-firm pair is not fully
 
revealed even after a match is formed.We incorporate permanent and temporary contracts
 
into an equilibrium search model and consider a situation in which temporary contracts are
 
used to screen workers for permanent positions. Although employers cannot accurately
 
observe the true quality of a match,they receive an observable signal about the quality of the
 
match when hiring a worker.Employers’hiring decisions are based on the realisation of this
 
signal and are characterised as the determination of the hiring thresholds.
The main results obtained in this paper are summarised as follows. First, reducing
 
dismissal costs increases job creation. Second, a reduction in dismissal costs entails a
 
reduction in the difference in hiring thresholds between permanent and temporary contracts,
which implies that employers will be less selective in hiring workers into permanent contracts
 
when dismissal costs fall.From a different perspective,temporary contracts are likely to be
 
used as screening devices in countries with stringent employment protection of permanent
 
employment. Third, a rise in the probability that the true quality of a match is revealed
 
lowers the hiring threshold for temporary contracts but raises the threshold for permanent
 
contracts if employers’costs of dismissing permanent workers rise.
Table 3 The effect of?on?,??and??when ?????
α 0.05 0.1 0.13 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
θ 1.651 1.706 1.723 1.731 1.747 1.758 1.767 1.774 1.781 1.787 1.793
π? 0.496 0.451 0.438 0.433 0.429 0.432 0.44 0.452 0.467 0.486 0.508
π? 0.389 0.294 0.258 0.238 0.201 0.175 0.155 0.14 0.127 0.117 0.109
Table 4 The effect of?on?,??and??when ???
α 0.05 0.1 0.13 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
θ 1.782 1.847 1.867 1.877 1.895 1.907 1.916 1.923 1.928 1.932 1.936
π? 0.461 0.381 0.351 0.336 0.307 0.288 0.276 0.268 0.2652 0.2654 0.269
π? 0.438 0.345 0.308 0.283 0.247 0.217 0.194 0.176 0.161 0.148 0.137
Table 5 The effect of?on?,??and??when ????
α 0.05 0.1 0.13 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
θ 1.5 1.547 1.563 1.571 1.587 1.599 1.61 1.62 1.63 1.64 1.65
π? 0.526 0.504 0.501 0.502 0.509 0.521 0.537 0.556 0.577 0.601 0.628
π? 0.337 0.247 0.214 0.197 0.164 0.142 0.126 0.114 0.104 0.097 0.091
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Although we performed numerical calculations to illustrate how some key parameters
 
affect job creation and firms’hiring decisions, the results obtained are not robust, as the
 
choice of parameter values and functional forms is not based on calibration.To make the
 
results of our model more convincing,we must examine whether similar results are obtained
 
through a more sophisticated quantitative analysis.
Appendix
 
A. Proof of Proposition 1
 
We prove the statements of the proposition by relying on the following three facts:(i)
??0?is strictly less than???0?;(ii)??1?is strictly greater than???1?;and (iii)??π??is
 
strictly less than zero,whereπ?is given by(18).
First,it follows from (16)that??0?－???0?is expressed by
??0?－???0?＝β?1－λ??1－α???0?－β?,
＝ β?1－λ??1－α?1－β?1－λ??1－α???－γ－
η?θ
β?1－η?＋?1－β??－β?,
＝ β?1－λ??1－α?1－β?1－λ??1－α???－γ－
η?θ
β?1－η?
＋β??1－λ??1－α??1－β?－1＋β?1－λ??1－α???1－β?1－λ??1－α? ,
＝ β?1－λ??1－α?1－β?1－λ??1－α???－γ－
η?θ
β?1－η?－
β?1－?1－λ??1－α???
1－β?1－λ??1－α? . (A1)
??????????? ????
?
?
??????????? ????
?
?
????????????????????
??????????? ????
?
? ???????????
If(19)is satisfied,the first term in (A1)and the total sign of(A1)are negative.
Second,from (11),we obtain
??1?－???1?＝?1－βα?1－λ????1?＋ η?θβ?1－η?－???－γ?. (A2)????
We note that from (13)and (15),??1?is represented by
??1?＝??1?－?＝??－γ－η?θ?β?1－η?＋?1－β??－?1－β＋βλ??1－β?1－λ?
＝??－γ－η?θ?β?1－η?－βλ?1－β?1－λ? . (A3)
?????????????????????
?????????????
Substituting (A3)into (A2)and arranging it yield
??1?－???1?＝ 11－β?1－λ??1－βα?1－λ????－γ－
η?θ
β?1－η?－βλ?
＋?1－β?1－λ?? η?θβ?1－η?－???－γ? ,
????????
?
? ????
?
?
?
?????
?
?
?
?
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＝ 11－β?1－λ??β?1－λ?－βα?1－λ????－γ－
η?θ
β?1－η?－βλ?1－βα?1－λ??? ,
＝β?1－λ??1－α?1－β?1－λ? ??－γ－
η?θ
β?1－η?－
λ?1－βα?1－λ???
?1－λ??1－α? . (A4)
????????
?
? ????
?
?
?
?
?????????? ???? ????????
?
?
This takes a non-negative value if(20)holds.Since both??π?and???π?are linear inπ,there
 
exists a uniqueπ?∈?0,1?that satisfies (17).
Finally,we will show thatπ?is strictly greater thanπ?.To prove this statement,it is
 
sufficient to show that??π??has a negative sign because the slope of??π?is larger than that
 
of???π?for anyπ.???Evaluating (9)byπ?and substituting (18)result in
??π??＝???－??＋βα?1－λ???1??π?＋??－γ＋β?1－λ??1－α????π??＋??－ η?θβ?1－η?－β?,????
??1－β?1－λ??1－α????π??＝???－??＋βα?1－λ???1??π?＋??－γ
－ η?θβ?1－η?－β?1－?1－λ??1－α???,????
??1－β?1－λ??1－α????π??＝ ??－??＋β?1－λ?α??1???－??＋β?1－λ?α??1?－β?1－λ?α??????????????????
× η?θβ?1－η?－???－γ?－
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?－β?1－?1－λ??1－α???,
?
?????
?
?
?
?????
?
?
＝ β?1－λ?α???－??＋β?1－λ?α??1?－β?1－λ?α?
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?－β?1－?1－λ??1－α???,?????????????????
?
?????
?
?
＝β?1－λ?α? 1??－??＋β?1－λ?α??1?－β?1－λ?α?
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?
?
??????????????????
?
?????
?
?
－1－?1－λ??1－α?α?1－λ? . (A5)????????
?
?
Regarding a sign of(A5),its first term in the brace is less than one because
??－??＋β?1－λ?α??1?－β?1－λ?α?－ η?θβ?1－η?－???－γ?,
＝??－γ＋β?1－λ?α???1?＋??－β?1－λ?α?－ η?θβ?1－η?,
＝??－γ－ η?θβ?1－η?＋β?1－λ?α??1?＞0,
?
?????
?
?
????
????
where condition (20)ensures that???
??－γ－ η?θβ?1－η?＞0and??1?＞0.????
Because the second term of the brace in (A5)is obviously greater than one,the overall sign
 
of(A5)is negative.This indicates that??π?is less than???π?atπ?????π??＝0?.The proof
 
is complete.
16)This fact is obtained by differentiating (16)with respect toπand using ?′?π?＞0.
17) If(20)is satisfied,(A3)takes a positive value and therefore??1?＞0.
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B. Proof of Lemma 1
We first show that the coefficient of the last term in (38)is less than one.Actually,we
obtain
1－α?1－λ??1－β?1－λ??1＋βλ?1－α????1－β?1－λ???1－?1－λ??1－α?? ＝
λ?1－β?1－λ??＋β?λα?1－α??1－λ??
?1－β?1－λ???1－?1－λ??1－α?? ＞0.??????????????????????????????????
We also note that the following inequality derives from (20):
??－γ－ η?θβ?1－η?＞0. (B-1)????
Then the sum of the first and the last terms in the brace of(38)has a positive sign and the
overall sign of(38)is positive.The proof is complete.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
It follows from (17′)and (18)that the numerator ofπ?－π?is expressed by
???－??＋βα?1－λ???1?－βα?1－λ??? η?θβ?1－η?－???－γ?＋ν?
?
?????
?
?
－???－??＋βα?1－λ???1?＋κ?? η?θβ?1－η?－???－γ?,
?
?????
?
?
＝－?βα?1－λ?＋κ? η?θβ?1－η?－???－γ??＋ν???－??＋βα?1－λ???1?－βα?1－λ????,
?
?????
?
?
＝－ βα?1－λ?＋α?1－β?1－λ??1－α??1－α
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ??
?
? ???????????
?
?
?
?????
?
?
＋ν???－??＋βα?1－λ???1?－βα?1－λ????,
＝－ α1－α
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ??＋ν???－??＋βα?1－λ???1?－βα?1－λ????, (C-1)???
?
?????
?
?
Partially differentiating (C-1)with respect to?for a givenθyields
ν???－??＋βα?1－λ???1?－βα?1－λ???＋νβα?1－λ????1??? －1?
?
?????
?
?
－ α1－α
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?,???
?
?????
?
?
＝υ??－??＋βα?1－λ???1?－βα?1－λ?1＋ βλ1－β?1－λ??
?
?
?
? ??????
?
?
?
?
－ α1－α
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?,???
?
?????
?
?
＝υ??－??＋βα?1－λ???－γ－η?θ?β?1－η?＋?1－β??1－β?1－λ? －
?1－β＋2βλ??
1－β?1－λ?
?
?
?
????????????????????????
?
?
?
?
－ α1－α
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?,???
?
?????
?
?
＝υ??－??＋βα?1－λ???－γ－η?θ?β?1－η?－2βλ?1－β?1－λ? －
α
ν?1－α?
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ? ,
?
?
?
???????????????
?
? ????
?
?????
?
?
?
?
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＝υ??－??－ α?1－λ?1－?1－λ??1－α?
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?
?
? ????????
?
?????
?
?
＋βα?1－λ???－γ－η?θ?β?1－η?－2βλ?1－β?1－λ? . (C-2)
?
???????????????
?
?
?
?
The first line of(C-2)is positive because(20)holds and
α?1－λ?
1－?1－λ??1－α?＜1.????????
The second line of(C-2)also becomes positive if the following condition holds:
??－γ－ η?θβ?1－η?－2βλ?＞0.????
Whether this condition is more restrictive than (20)or not depends on the value of parame-
ters.In any case,(C-2)takes a positive sign if??is sufficiently large.
We next examine how the denominator of π?－π?responds to a change in ?. The
 
denominator ofπ?－π?is given by
???－??＋βα?1－λ???1?－βα?1－λ??????－??＋βα?1－λ???1?＋κ??,
＝???－??＋βα?1－λ???1???＋???－??＋βα?1－λ???1???κ－βα?1－λ???
－κβα?1－λ???. (C-3)
Partially differentiating (C-3)with respect to?yields
2βα?1－λ????－??＋βα?1－λ???1?????1??? ＋βα?1－λ??κ－βα?1－λ???
???1?
??
＋???－??＋βα?1－λ???1???κ－βα?1－λ??－2κβα?1－λ?,
＝???－??＋βα?1－λ???1??2βα?1－λ??1－β?1－β?1－λ? ＋κ－βα?1－λ?
＋βα?1－α??κ－βα?1－λ??????1??? －2κβα?1－λ?. (C-4)
???? ????
?
??????????
?
?
????
Noticing that???1???tends to be zero asβ→1,(C-4)takes a negative sign ifκ－α?1－λ??
0 or
α? 1－2λ2?1－λ?. (C-5)?????
Based on the results of the above calculations,an increase in?decreases the denomina-
tor ofπ?－π?and increases its numerator.This means thatπ?－π?is increasing with respect
 
to?for a givenθ.The proof is complete.
D. Proof of Proposition 3
 
The second term of (39) takes a negative value from Lemma 1 and ??′－??′＞0. (37)
ensures that a sign of the third term of (39)is negative.Although the last term is positive
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because??′???＞0,this becomes quite small for a sufficiently highβbecause
???′
??＝
αβ?1－λ??1－β?
?1－β?1－λ???1－β?1－λ??1－α??.?? ????????????????
Thus the overall sign of(39)is likely to be negative????′??＜0?.
Remembering that the LHS of(21)is increasing and the RHS of(21)is decreasing inθ,
we finally find that an increase in?decreasesθ.The proof is complete.
E. Proof of Proposition 4
 
We have already shown in Lemma 2 that a higher?increasesπ?－π?for a givenθ.Now
 
we will examine how a change inθaffects the difference in the hiring thresholds.
Before conducting the main calculation,some preliminary results are derived for anyθ:
?thedenominatorofπ?－π?
?θ ＝
??φ＋κ???φ－βα?1－λ???
?θ ,???????????????????????????
＝βα?1－λ????1??θ ?φ－βα?1－λ???＋βα?1－λ?
???1?
?θ ?φ＋κ??,??? ???
＝－βα?1－λ?η??β?1－η?1－β?1－λ? ?2φ＋?κ－βα?1－λ????, (E-1)?????????
?thenumeratorofπ?－π?
?θ ,??????????????
＝ ??θ －
α
1－α
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ??＋ν?φ－βα?1－λ???? ,??
?
? ???
?
?????
?
?
?
?
＝－ α1－α
η?
β?1－η??－
νβα?1－λ?η??β?1－η?
1－β?1－λ? ?,??????? ??????????
＝－ η??β?1－η?
α
1－α＋
νβα?1－λ?
1－β?1－λ?, (E-2)????
?
???? ??????
?
?
where we defineφasφ≡??－??＋βα?1－λ???1?.
Now we compute??π?－π???θ.Then it follows from(E-1)and(E-2)that the numerator
 
of??π?－π???θis written by
－ η??β?1－η?
α
1－α＋
νβα?1－λ?
1－β?1－λ??φ＋κ???φ－βα?1－λ???????
?
???? ??????
?
?
＋βα?1－λ?η??β?1－η?1－β?1－λ? ?2φ＋?κ－βα?1－λ??????????????
× － α1－α
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ??＋ν?φ－βα?1－λ???? ,
?
? ???
?
?????
?
?
?
?
＝－η???φ－βα?1－λ???β?1－η?
α?φ＋κ??
1－α ＋
νβα?1－λ??φ＋κ??
1－β?1－λ???????????
?
????????????????
－νβα?1－λ??2φ＋?κ－βα?1－λ????1－β?1－λ? －
α?1－λ?η????1－η?
?1－α??1－β?1－λ??
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ????????????????
?
? ?????????
?
?????
?
?
×?2φ＋?κ－βα?1－λ????. (E-3)
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A sign of entire(E-3)depends on a sign of the first term in(E-3).To identify the sign of the
 
brace in the first term,it is sufficient to focus on the following :
α?φ＋κ??
1－α ＋
νβα?1－λ??φ＋κ??
1－β?1－λ? －
νβα?1－λ??2φ＋?κ－βα?1－λ????
1－β?1－λ? ,
＝α?φ＋κ??1－α －
νβα?1－λ??2φ＋κ?－βα?1－λ??－φ－κ??
1－β?1－λ? ,
＝α?φ＋κ??1－α －
νβα?1－λ??φ－βα?1－λ???
1－β?1－λ? ,
＝α?φ＋κ??1－α －
?1－?1－λ??1－α??βα?1－λ??φ－βα?1－λ???
?1－λ??1－α??1－β?1－λ?? ,
＝α?φ＋κ??1－α －
?1－?1－λ??1－α??βα?φ－βα?1－λ???
?1－α??1－β?1－λ?? ,
＝ α1－α φ＋κ?－
?1－?1－λ??1－α??β?φ－βα?1－λ???
1－β?1－λ? . (E-4)
??????????????? ???????????????
??????????????????????????
??????????????????
??????????????????????????
????????????????????????
????? ?????????????????
?
?
By the definition ofφ,(E-4)increases with respect to?for a givenθ.???This means that (E
-3)is likely to take a negative value for a higher?and thatπ?－π?decreases with respect
 
toθ.From Proposition 3,we have already known?θ??＜0 in the steady-state equilibrium.
Thus,the indirect effect of?onπ?－π?throughθis positive.
Combining the result of Lemma 2,we conclude that the total effects of dismissal costs
 
on the difference in the hiring thresholds are negative.The proof is complete.
F. Proof of Proposition 5
 
From (17′),we obtain
?π?
?α＝
1
???－??＋βα?1－λ???1?＋κ???
???－??＋βα?1－λ???1?＋κ???
?1－λ??1－α??
－ η?θβ?1－η?－???－γ?＋ν? β?1－λ???1?＋
?α＋?1－α??1－β?1－λ??1－α????
?1－α?? ,
(F-1)
?? ????????????????????????????????
?
?????
?
?
?
? ???????????????
?
?
?
?
where for a givenθ,
?ν
?α＝
?1－λ??1－α?＋1－?1－λ??1－α?
?1－λ??1－α?? ＝
1
?1－λ??1－α??＞0,
??
?α＝
?1－β?1－λ??1－α?＋αβ?1－λ???1－α?＋α?1－β?1－λ??1－α??
?1－α?? ,
＝?1－α??1－β?1－λ??1－α??＋α?1－α?? ＞0.
?? ??????????????????????
?? ????????????????????????????
??????????????
18)We also notice that
?
???φ－βα?1－λ???＝βα?1－λ?
???1?
?? －1 ,??
?
?????
?
?
where?φ??＝βα?1－λ????1???.
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Regarding the numerator of(F-1),we focus on the coefficients of??1?,which are given by
βα?
?1－α??－β?1－λ?
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?＋ν? ,
＝ βα??1－α??－
β?1－?1－λ??1－α???
1－α －β?1－λ?
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?,
＝β?α－?1－α??1－?1－λ??1－α?????1－α?? －β?1－λ?
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?,
＝β?α－?1－α??α＋λ?1－α?????1－α?? －β?1－λ?
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?. (F-2)
???? ??????
?
?
???? ??????????? ??????
?
?
??????????????? ??????
?
?
????????????? ??????
?
?
The first term of (F-2) is non-negative if α－?1－α??1－?1－λ??1－α???0. This result is
 
obtained whenαsatisfies
α?－λ＋ λ1－λ . (F-3)
????????
For a higher?,(F-2)is likely to be positive under (F-3)because the equilibrium value ofθ
is a decreasing function of?as shown in Proposition 3.
We next examine a sign of the other terms in the numerator of(F-1).That is,
1
?1－λ??1－α?? ??－??＋
α?1－β?1－λ??1－α???
1－α ?－?1－λ?
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?
＋?1－?1－λ??1－α????1－λ??1－α? ??1－α??1－β?1－λ??1－α??＋α?? . (F-4)
?????????
?
? ???????????
?
?
?
?????
???????????
?
?
Arranging (F-4)yields
?
?1－λ??1－α????－??－?1－λ???1－α??1－β?1－λ??1－α??＋α????????
?
?
× η?θβ?1－η?－???－γ?＋
α?1－β?1－λ??1－α???
1－α
?
?????
?
? ???????????
－?1－?1－λ??1－α????1－α??1－β?1－λ??1－α??＋α??1－α ,???????????????????????
?
?
? ??1－λ??1－α????－??－
η?θ
β?1－η?－???－γ?＋
α?1－β?1－λ??1－α???
1－α???????
?
?
?
?????
?
? ???????????
－?1－?1－λ??1－α????1－α??1－β?1－λ??1－α??＋α??1－α ,???????????????????????
?
?
＝ ??1－λ??1－α????－γ－
η?θ
β?1－η?＋
α?1－β?1－λ??1－α???
1－α???????
?
? ???? ???????????
－?1－?1－λ??1－α????1－α??1－β?1－λ??1－α??＋α??1－α ,???????????????????????
?
?
? ??1－λ??1－α????－γ－
η?θ
β?1－η?＋
α?1－β?1－λ??1－α???
1－α －
?1－?1－λ??1－α???
1－α ,???????
?
? ???? ??????????? ?????????
?
?
＝ ??1－λ??1－α????－γ－
η?θ
β?1－η?＋
?α－αβ?1－λ??1－α?－?λ＋α－λα???
1－α ,???????
?
? ???? ?????????????????
?
?
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＝ ??1－λ??1－α????－γ－
η?θ
β?1－η?－
?1－α??αβ?1－λ?＋λ??
1－α ,???????
?
? ???? ???????????
?
?
＝ ??1－λ??1－α????－γ－
η?θ
β?1－η?－?αβ?1－λ?＋λ?? .???????
?
? ????
?
?
This has a positive sign if the following inequality holds:
??－γ－ η?θβ?1－η?－?αβ?1－λ?＋λ??＞0. (F-5)????
If(F-5)is satisfied,a sign of(F-4)is also positive.Finally we obtain?π??α＞0.The proof is
 
complete.
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